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Abstract
Prevalent theories in cognitive science propose that
humans understand and represent the knowledge of
the world through causal relationships. In making
sense of the world, we build causal models in our
mind to encode cause-effect relations of events and
use these to explain why new events happen. In this
paper, we use causal models to derive causal ex-
planations of behaviour of reinforcement learning
agents. We present an approach that learns a struc-
tural causal model during reinforcement learning
and encodes causal relationships between variables
of interest. This model is then used to generate
explanations of behaviour based on counterfactual
analysis of the causal model. We report on a study
with 120 participants who observe agents playing a
real-time strategy game (Starcraft II) and then re-
ceive explanations of the agents’ behaviour. We
investigated: 1) participants’ understanding gained
by explanations through task prediction; 2) expla-
nation satisfaction and 3) trust. Our results show
that causal model explanations perform better on
these measures compared to two other baseline ex-
planation models.
1 Introduction
Driven by lack of trust from users and proposed regulations,
there are many calls for Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems to
become more transparent, interpretable and explainable. This
has renewed the interest in Explainable AI (XAI), explored
since the expert systems era [Chandrasekaran et al., 1989].
A key pillar of XAI is explanation, a justification given for
decisions and actions of the system.
However, much research and practice in XAI pays little at-
tention to people as intended users of these systems, [Miller,
2018b]. If we are to build systems that are capable of provid-
ing ‘good’ explanations, it is plausible that explanation mod-
els should mimic models of human explanation [De Graaf
and Malle, 2017]. Thus, to build XIA models it is essential
to begin with a strong understanding on how people define,
generate, select and evaluate explanations. This paper con-
tributes to an understanding of the interplay between system
provided explanations and human trust in system behaviour.
There is a wealth of pertinent literature in cognitive psy-
chology and social sciences that explores the nature of ex-
planations and how people understand them. As humans, we
view the world through a causal lens, where we associate ob-
served events and mechanisms to causal relationships [Slo-
man, 2005]. We build mental models (causal models) with
these relationships to act in the world, to understand new
events and also to explain events. Importantly, causal models
give people the ability to consider counterfactuals — events
that did not happen, but could have under different situations.
Although this notion of causal explanation is also backed by
the literature in social psychology [Hilton, 2007], causality is
only just starting to become more prevalent in XAI research.
Furthermore, compared to the burst of research XAI in plan-
ning, machine learning and autonomous agents, explainabil-
ity in reinforcement learning is hardly explored.
In this paper, we introduce an action influence model for
reinforcement learning (RL) agents, drawing from insights in
cognitive science. We provide a formalization of the model
using structural causal models [Halpern and Pearl, 2005].
Our approach differs from previous work in explainability,
in that we use causal models to generate contrastive explana-
tions for why and why not questions, which previous models
lack. Given assumptions about the direction of causal rela-
tionships between variables, we learn the quantitative rela-
tionships between variables. We introduce algorithms to gen-
erate and select explanans (causes that constitutes the expla-
nation of an action) for a given explanandum (the action to ex-
plain in RL context) from the action influence graph. We de-
fine minimally complete explanations taking inspiration from
social psychology literature [McClure and Hilton, 1997] and
through human experiments show that our model performs
significantly better than current models in the literature.
We conducted a comprehensive human study using the im-
plemented model for RL agents trained to play the real-time
strategy game Starcraft II. Experiments were run for 120 par-
ticipants, in which we evaluate the participants’ performance
in task prediction [Hoffman et al., 2018, p.12], explanation
satisfaction, and trust. Results show that our model performs
better than the tested baseline, but its impact on trust is not
statistically significant.
The main contributions of this paper are twofold, 1) We
introduce and formalise an action influence model based on
structural causal models and present algorithms to generate
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and select explanations; 2) We conduct a between-subject hu-
man study to evaluate the proposed model with baselines.
2 Related Work
There exists a substantial body of literature that explores ex-
plaining the policies and decisions of Markov Decision Pro-
cesses (MDP), though most of them do not explicitly focus on
reinforcement learning. Elizalde et al. [2009] generated ex-
planations by selecting and using ‘relevant’ variables of states
of factored MDPs, which were evaluated by relevant domain
experts. Taking the long term effect an action has, Khan et
al. [2009] proposed generating sufficient and minimal expla-
nations for MDPs using domain independent templates.
More recently Wang et al. [2016] explored generating
explanations in human-robot collaboration scenarios using
natural language templates. Policy explanations in human-
agent interaction settings has been used to achieve trans-
parency [Hayes and Shah, 2017] and provide summaries of
the policies [Amir and Amir, 2018]. Explanation in reinforce-
ment learning has been explored, using interactive RL to gen-
erate explanations using instructions of a human [Fukuchi et
al., 2017] and to provide constrastive explanations [van der
Waa et al., 2018], however, their explanations are not based
on an underlying causal model.
Humans understand the world through a causal lens [Slo-
man, 2005; Pearl and Mackenzie, 2018]. Humans expect XAI
systems to have familiar models of explanation [De Graaf
and Malle, 2017], thus having causal models of explana-
tion can intuitively provide human-like explanations.Previous
work has paid little attention to human-centered explanations
and causal explanations in RL agents have not been studied.
Other work on causal explanation has focused on scien-
tific explanations [Salmon, 1984], explanations using causal
trees [Nielsen et al., 2012] and causal explanations of fair-
ness [Zhang and Bareinboim, 2018].
Although some recent work has emphasized the im-
portance of causal explanation for explainable AI sys-
tems [Miller, 2018b; Klein, 2018; Miller, 2018a], work on
generating explanations from causal explanation models for
MDPs and RL agents has been absent.
3 Causal Models for Explanations
In this section, we define the action influence model, which is
based on the notion of structural causal models from Halpern
and Pearl [2005].
3.1 Preliminaries : Structural Causal Models
Structural causal models (SCMs) represent the world using
random variables, divided into exogenous (external) and en-
dogenous (internal), some of which might have causal rela-
tionships which each other. These relationships can be de-
scribed with a set of structural equations. Formally, a sig-
nature S is a tuple (U ,V,R), where U is the set of exoge-
nous variables, V the set of endogenous variables, and R is
a function that denotes the range of values for every variable
Y ∈ U ∪ V .
Definition 3.1. A structural causal model is a tuple M =
(S,F), where F denotes a set of structural equations,
one for each X ∈ V , such that FX : (×U∈UR(U)) ×(×Y ∈V−{X}R(Y )) → R(X) give the value of X based on
other variables in U ∪V . That is, the equation FX defines the
value of X based on some other variables in the model.
A context ~u is a vector of unique values of each exogenous
variable u ∈ U . A situation is defined as a model/context
pair (M,~u). An instantation is defined by assigning vari-
ables the values corresponding to those defined by their struc-
tural equations. Halpern and Pearl [2005] define a notation of
counterfactual models, defined M ~X←~x, which means set the
values of the vector of endogenous variables ~X to the val-
ues ~x and define all successor variables their values based on
these new values.
A SCM can be represented by a directed acyclic graph
(DAG), in which nodes corresponds to V endogenous vari-
ables and edges denote causal relationships.
3.2 Causal Models for Reinforcement Learning
Agents
In this section we introduce a general definition of action in-
fluence models for MDP-based RL agents, which is based
on SCMs with addition of actions. A MDP is a tuple
(S,A, T ,Rγ), where S and A give state and action spaces
respectively (here we assume the state and action space is
finite and state features are described by a set of variables
φ); T = {Psa} a set of state transition functions (Psa de-
notes state transition distribution of taking action a in state
s); R : S × A → R is a reward function and γ = [0, 1)
is a discount factor. Objective of an RL agent is to find a
policy pi that maps states to actions maximizing the expected
discounted sum of rewards. We define a causal explanation
model for RL agents as follows.
Formally, a signature S is a tuple (U ,V,R,A), in which
U , V , andR are as in SCMs, and A is the set of actions.
Definition 3.2. An action influence model for a RL agent is
a tuple (S,F), where S is as in SCMs, and F is the set of
structural equations, in which we have multiple for each X ∈
V — one for each unique action set that influences X . A
function FX.A, for A ∈ A, defines the causal effect on X
from applying action A. The set of reward variables Xr ⊆ V
are defined by the set of nodes with an out-degree of 0; that
is, the set of sink nodes.
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of an action in-
fluence model as an action influence diagram of an agent for
the real-time strategy game Starcraft II, with exogenous vari-
ables omitted. These models are SCMs except that each edge
is associated with an action. Note that for our action influence
model, each state variable has a set of structural equations:
one for each incoming action.
We define the actual instantiation of a model M as the
model M~V←~S , in which ~S is the vector of state variable val-
ues from an MDP.
4 Explanation Generation
In this section we provide definitions and algorithms that gen-
erate explanations from our action influence model. At a
high level the process of explanation generation has 3 phases:
Rewards
State variables:
W - Worker number
S - Supply depot number
B - barracks number
E - enemay location
A n - Ally unit number
A h - Ally unit health
A l - Ally unit location
D u - Destoryed units
D b - Destroyed buildings
Actions:
A s - build supply depot
A s - build barracks
A m - train offensive unit
A a - attack
As
W
S
B
An
El
Ah
Al
Db
Du
Ab
Am
Am
Aa
Aa
Aa
Aa
Aa
Aa
Aa
Aa
Figure 1: Action influence graph of a Starcraft II agent
Algorithm 1 Causal chain extraction for actions
Input: instantiated causal influence graph M , explanan-
dum(action) a
Output: Explanan tuple list
(
~Xr = ~xr, ~Xh = ~xh, ~Xi = ~xi
)
1: ~Xr ← [] ; rewards variables
2: ~Xh ← [] ; head variables
3: ~Xi ← [] ; intermediate variables
4: for e ∈M.edges labelled with action a do
5: ~Xh ← ~Xh · 〈head(e)〉; head node of edge e
6: ~Xr ← ~Xr · traverseDAG(M); sink/reward nodes
7: ~Xp ← ~Xp · getPredecessors( ~Xr); predecessors
nodes of sink nodes
8: end for
9: return list
(
~Xr = ~xr, ~Xh = ~xh, ~Xi = ~xi
)
1) defining the qualitative relationship as an action influence
graph; 2) learning the structural equations during RL; 3) then
using the SCM to generate explanans by instantiating the
causal state.
We define an explanation as a pair that that consist of: 1) an
explanandum, the event to be explained; and 2) an explanan,
the subset of causes given as the explanation [Miller, 2018b].
Consider the example ‘Why did you do P?’ and the explana-
tion ‘Because of Q’. The explanandum is P and explanans is
Q. Identifying the explanandum from a question is not a triv-
ial task. In this paper, we assume that explanandums are of
the form ‘Why A?’ or ‘Why not A?’, where A is an action.
In the context of a RL agent we define a complete explanan.
Definition 4.1. An complete explanan for an action
a under the actual instantiation M~V←~S is a tuple(
~Xr = ~xr, ~Xh = ~xh, ~Xi = ~xi
)
, in which ~Xr is the vector
of reward variables reached by following the causal chain of
the DAG to sink nodes; ~Xh the vector of variables of the head
node of action a, ~Xi the vector of intermediate nodes between
head and reward nodes, and ~xr, ~xh, and ~xi are the values of
these variables under M~V←~S .
Informally, this defines a complete explanan for action a as
the complete causal chain from action a to any future reward
that it can receive. An algorithm for extracting this is shown
in Figure 1.
4.1 ‘Why?’ Questions
Explanatory questions can be broadly divided into three
classes: 1) What; 2) How; and 3) Why questions [Miller,
2018b, p. 12]. Lim et al. [2009] found that the most de-
manded explanatory questions are Why and Why not ques-
tions. To this end we focus on explanation generation for why
and why not questions in this paper.
Minimally Complete Explanations
Striking a balance between complete and minimal explana-
tions depend on the epistemic state of the explainee [Miller,
2018b]. As we are interested in causality, and for simplicity
we assume that we know nothing about the epistemic state of
the explainee. Thus we focus on generating minimally com-
plete explanations assuming that the explainee has no prior
knowledge about the causal model of the agent.
Recall the Definition 4.1 of explanans, a ‘complete’ ex-
planation would include explanans of all the intermediate
nodes between the head and reward node of the causal chain.
Clearly, an explanation with that much explanans risks over-
whelming the explainee with unnecessary details. For this
reason we define minimally complete explanations.
McClure and Hilton [1997] show that referring to the goal
as being most important for actions. In our causal models,
the rewards are the ‘goals’, but these are not meaningful from
explanations. As such, we treat the predecessor nodes, which
define the immediate causes of the reward, as the ‘end goal’.
However, this alone is a longer-term motivation for taking
an action. As such, we also include the head node as the
immediate reason for doing the action. For this reason we use
this model to define our minimally complete explanations.
Definition 4.2. A minimally complete explanation is a tu-
ple
(
~Xr = ~xr, ~Xh = ~xh, ~Xp = ~xp
)
, in which ~Xr = ~xr and
~Xh = ~xh do not change from Definition 4.1, and ~Xp = ~xp is
the vector of variables that are immediate predecessors of any
variable in Xr, with ~xp the values in the actual instantiation.
Informally, a minimally complete explanation would have
the explanans comprising the influenced node of the action
(explanandum); reward nodes of the causal chain, and the di-
rect causes of the reward nodes.
4.2 ‘Why not?’ Questions
Why not questions let the explainee ask why an event has not
occurred, thus allowing counterfactuals to be explained. Our
model generates counterfactual explanations by comparing
causal chains of the actual event occurred and the explanan-
dum (counterfactual action). First, we define a counterfactual
influence graph that specifies the optimal states under which
the counterfactual action B would be chosen, by instantiat-
ing all predecessor variables ~Z of the counterfactual action
with the current state values (that is, the model M~Z← ~SZ ) and
then instantiating all successor nodes by simulating using the
structural equations. This gives the ‘optimal’ conditions un-
der which we would select counterfactual action B. Then,
we find the values in that causal chain that are different to the
current state, and compare with the values in the causal chain
of factual action A.
For readability, in the following definition, we have ~X = ~x
to represent the 3-tuple
(
~Xr = ~xr, ~Xh = ~xh, ~Xp = ~xp
)
, and
similar for ~Y = ~y.
Definition 4.3. Given a minimally complete explanation
~X = ~x for action A under the actual instantation, and a min-
imally complete explanation ~Y = ~y for action B under the
counterfactual instantiation M~Z← ~SZ , we define a minimally
complete constrastive explanan as the pair ( ~X ′ = ~x′, ~X ′ =
~y′) such that ~X ′ is the maximal set of variables in ~X in which
( ~X ′ = ~x′) ∩ ( ~X ′ = ~y′) 6= ∅. That is, we only explain things
that are different between the actual and counterfactual. This
corresponds to the difference condition [Miller, 2018a].
We use Algorithm 1 to generate the causal chain, and use
the Definition 4.3 to generate counterfactuals. Consider the
example below from Figure 1, which is generated from our
algorithm (a simple NLP template is used).
Example 4.1. Consider the question asking why a Starcraft II
agent built a barracks for training marines, rather than choos-
ing to train marines:
Question Why not do action build barracks (Ab)?
Explanation Because Barrack number (B) is 2 which is
optimal: It is more desirable to do action
train marine (Am) to have more Ally units
(An) as the goal is to have more Destroyed
Units (Du) and Destroyed buildings (Db).
Here Ab is the counterfactual case, and Am is the actual
case with B being the counterfactual values and An, Du and
Db being the counterfactual explanation having the explanans
of head and reward nodes respectively. There is no extra pre-
decessor node as it is the same as the head node.
4.3 Explanation Selection
Algorithm 1 gives us a set of explanations for a given ex-
planandum, and we need to select the most suitable explana-
tion to present to the explainee. We use the following formula
to rank the explanations.
Definition 4.4. The ‘best’ explanation from a set of ex-
planans is defined as E = argmax
∑ |Eo − Evi|. That is,
the 3-tuple that has the highest combined difference of the
current variable values against the optimal variable values of
the head,reward and predecessor node is selected.
Our method of selecting the ‘best’ explanation is based
on notion of resolving the cognitive dissonance of the ex-
plainee [Yuan et al., 2011], in that the explanation with the
most surprising fact will be selected. Most surprising expla-
nation would be the one 3-tuple explanans that has maximum
current variable value difference with their optimal values.
4.4 Learning Structural Causal Equations
Our approach so far relies on knowing the structural model, in
particular, to determine the effects of counterfactual actions.
Why not questions are inherently counterfactual [Balke and
Pearl, 1995], and having just the policy of an RL agent is
not enough as the counterfactual refers to a possible worlds
that did not happen. Consider the Example 4.1, to generate
this explanation, optimal/maximum of the state variable (B)
is needed in the given time instance.
However, in model-free reinforcement learning, such envi-
ronment dynamics are not known, and learning a model of the
environment is a difficult problem. However, given a graph
of causal relations between variables, learning a set of struc-
tural equations that are approximate yet ‘good enough’ to give
counterfactual explanations may be feasible. To this end, we
assume that the a DAG specifying causal direction between
variables is given, and learn the structural equations as multi-
variate linear regression models during the training phase of
the agent. In our study in Section 5, as we assume that the re-
lationships between state variables are linear. For other non-
linear domains, learning can be done using decisions trees,
Bayesian methods, etc.
While this approach may seem similar to learning environ-
ment dynamics of model-based RL methods, we only learn
the structural equations, not the entire model, and we are only
after an approximation that is good enough for explaining in-
stances, thus they can be wrong but still useful for the ex-
plainee. Further, specifying the assumptions about the causal
direction between variables is a much easier problem to en-
code by hand, and can be tested with data. In the learning
process we take batch samples of 5k steps for each iteration,
and feed the state variable values to the set of multivariate
regression models obtained from the SCM.
5 Empirical Evaluation: Human Study
A human-grounded evaluation is essential to evaluate ex-
plainability of a system, thus we carry out human-subject ex-
periments involving explaining RL agents. We present two
main hypotheses for the empirical evaluation as follows; H1)
Causal model based explanations build better mental models
of the agent leading to better understanding of its strategies
(We make the assumption here that there is no intermediate
effect on the mental model from other sources); and H2) Bet-
ter understanding of an agent’s strategies promotes trust in
the agent.
5.1 Methodology, design and experiments
We chose StarCraft II, a real-time strategy game as the
domain of agents. StarCraft II is a popular RL environ-
ment [Vinyals et al., 2017] that has a large state space with
partial observablity. We implemented a Q-learning agent for
our experiment that compete with a default agent in game in
the default map.
At a high level, our experiment involves, 1) visually dis-
playing how the agent acts in Starcraft II; 2) allowing partic-
ipants to seek explanations of the agent behaviour; 3) gath-
ering data on participants’ understanding of agent behaviour
through prediction tasks; 4) gathering data on explanation sat-
isfaction and participants’ trust of the agent.
To evaluate hypothesis 1 (H1), we use the method of task
prediction [Hoffman et al., 2018]. Task prediction can pro-
vide a quick view of the explainee’s mental model formed
through explanations, where the task is for the participant
to predict ‘What will the agent do next?’. We use the 5-
point Likert Explanation Satisfaction Scale developed re-
cently by Hoffman et al. [2018, p.39] to measure the subjec-
tive quality of explanations through participant reported val-
ues. To evaluate hypothesis 2 (H2), we use the 5-point Likert
Trust Scale of Hoffman et al. [2018, p.49]. These methods
will be elaborated in context below.
We recorded a full gameplay video (22 min) with the
trained RL agents playing against in-game bot AI. Clips from
the gameplay video are the medium of visualizing the agent
behaviour to the participant. The experiment has 4 phases.
First phase involves collection of demographic informa-
tion and training the participants. Using five gameplay video
clips, the participant is trained to understand and differenti-
ate actions of the agent. Then, the participant is prompted to
identify an action of the agent using another gameplay video.
In the second phase, a clip of the gameplay video (15 sec)
is played in a web-based UI, with a textual description of the
scene. Participant can select the question type (why/why not)
and the action, which together form a question ‘Why/Why
not action A?’. Then, a textual explanation for the question
(using a basic NLP template for the domain) with a figure of
the relevant sub-graph of the agent’s causal influence graph
is displayed. Explanations are pre-generated from our imple-
mented algorithm and are stored in a web server. The partic-
ipant can ask multiple questions in a single gameplay video.
After every gameplay video the participant completes the Ex-
planation Satisfaction Scale. This process is repeated so we
have data for each participant from five gameplay videos.
The third phase gathers data on the understanding that
explainee has after seeing the agent play and the explana-
tions. The understanding is measured using the task predic-
tion method as follows: the participant is presented with an-
other gameplay video clip (10 sec), and presented with 3 se-
lections of textual descriptions of what action the agent will
do in next step; the participant selects an option, and has the
option of selecting ‘I dont know’. We expect the participant is
projecting forward the local strategy of the agent using their
mental model formed through explanations (textual explana-
tions of phase 1 are visible to the participant). The participant
also provides a free text explanation of why the selection was
made and their confidence level. This process is repeated 8
times. In the first 4 task predictions, the agent’s behaviour
is similar to the behaviour presented in phase 1, with differ-
ent variable values. In next 4 tasks, the agent behaviour is
novel. In the fourth phase, the participant completes the 5-
point Trust Scale.
We conducted the experiments on Amazon MTurk, a
crowd-sourcing platform popular for obtaining high-quality
data for human-subject experiments [Buhrmester et al.,
2011]. The experiment was fully implemented in an inter-
active web based environment. Experiment parameters are
given below.
The experiment was run with 4 independent variables, one
being our causal explanation model and the others being the
3 baselines described below: 1) Gameplay video without any
explanation; 2) Relevant variable explanations (explanations
are generated using state relevant variables using template 1
of Khan et al.[2009, p.3] and visualized through a state-action
graph, e.g ‘Action A is likely to increase relevant variable
Model pair mean-diff lwr upr p-adjusted
R - N 0.433 -1.432 2.298 0.930
D - N 1.666 -0.198 3.532 0.097
C - N 2.400 0.534 4.265 0.006
D - R 1.233 -0.632 3.098 0.316
C - R 1.966 0.101 3.832 0.034
C - D 0.733 -1.132 2.598 0.735
Table 1: Pairwise-comparisons of explanation models of task pre-
diction scores (higher positive diff is better)
P’); 3) Detailed causal influence graph explanations (Causal
graph is augmented to include atomic actions, e.g build-
ing barrack action is decomposed into selecting worker, se-
lecting building type, selecting build position).
We ran experiments for 120 participants, allocated evenly
to the independent variables. Each experiment ran approxi-
mately 40 minutes. We scored each participant on task pre-
diction, 2 points for a correct prediction; 1 for responding ‘I
dont know’ and 0 for an incorrect prediction for a total of 16
points. Scores were tallied. We compensated each participant
with 8.5USD, and a bonus of 0.5USD for every points above a
score of 13. Of the 120 participants 36 were female, 82 male
and 2 were undefined and aged between 19 to 59 (M=34.2).
Participants had an average self rated gaming experience and
Starcraft II experience of 3.38 and 2.02 out of 5 respectively.
5.2 Results
We first present our results on first main hypothesis, corre-
sponding null and alternative hypothesis are, 1) H0 : mC =
mR = mD = mN .; 2) H1 : mC ≥ mR.; 3) H2 : mC ≥
mD.; 4) H3 : mC ≥ mN , where abstract causal explanations
(our model), detailed causal explanations, relevant variable
explanations, and no explanations are given by C, D, R, and
N respectively.
4
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Figure 2: Box plot of task prediction scores of explanation models
with means represented as dots (higher is better).
We conduct one-way ANOVA and test for Homogene-
ity of Variance (p = 0.65, Levene’s test) and for normality
(Shapiro-Wilk, p = 0.029 > 0.01). Figure 2 illustrate the task
score variance with explanation models. We obtained a p-
value of 0.003 (MC = 10.90, MD = 10.20, MR = 8.97,
Metric Mdl-pair Mean-dif Median-dif p-val
Complete C-N 0.707 0.700 0.061C-R 0.873 1.000 0.012
Sufficient C-N 0.746 0.700 0.039C-R 1.013 1.000 0.002
Satisfying C-N 0.633 0.800 0.082C-R 0.740 0.700 0.029
Understand C-N 0.326 0.400 0.497C-R 0.400 0.400 0.316
Table 2: Explanation quality survey (likert scale data 1-5)
MN = 8.53), thus we conclude there are significant differ-
ences between models on task prediction scores. We per-
formed Tukey multiple pairwise-comparisons to obtain sig-
nificance between groups. Table 1 shows that the differences
between causal explanation model paired with other expla-
nation models is significant for C-R and C-N pairs with p-
values of 0.006 and 0.034. We also calculated the effect of
the number of questions might have on the score and found
no statistical correlation using a correlation test (number of
questions vs score, p = 0.33, model C) among same mod-
els. We further calculated scores based on 2 = ‘correct’, 0
= ‘incorrect or ‘don’t know’: Results were still significant
(p=0.009), means (C = 10.9, D = 10.3, R = 8.93, N = 8.73),
for model pairs (C-N p = 0.023, C-R p = 0.047), thus there is
no substantial difference in means. Thus we rejectH0 andH2
and accept all other alternative hypotheses. Results show that
causal model explanations lead to significantly better under-
standing of agent’s strategies than 2 baselines we evaluated,
specially against previous models of relevant explanations.
We now report our results on the self reported explana-
tion measurements. Figure 3 illustrates the quantitative dif-
ferences between likert scale and explanation metrics (under-
stand, satisfying, sufficient detail and complete) for aggre-
gated video explanations of explanation models. As before
we performed pair-wise ANOVA test, results are summarized
in Table 2. Our model obtained statistically significant re-
sults and outperformed the benchmark ‘relevant explanation’
(R) for all metrics except ‘Understand’.
We now evaluate the second main hypothesis: Explanation
models that achieve better understanding will promote trust in
the agent. The obtained p-values for trust metrics confident,
predictable, reliable and safe were not statistically significant
(usuing pair-wise ANOVA). This indicates that there is no
significant differences between explanation models to the par-
ticipant’s perceived level of trust of the agent. Although the
difference is not significant we can see causal models have
high means and medians (see Figure 4). We conclude that al-
though the explanations and scores are significantly better for
our model, to promote trust further interaction is necessary.
We further analysed self reported demographic data to see
if there is a correlation between task prediction scores and self
reported Starcraft II experience level (5-point Likert). Pear-
son’s correlation test was not significant (p =0.45) thus we
conclude there is no correlation between scores and experi-
ence level.
One limitation of our experiment is, while a complex do-
Figure 3: Box plot of explanation quality survey (likert scale 1-5,
higher is better, means represented as dots).
Figure 4: Box plot of trust survey (likert scale 1-5, higher is better).
main comparatively, we made a strong linearity assump-
tion for Starcraft II, which enabled linear regression to learn
SCMs for a relatively small number (9) of state variables.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we took inspiration from cognitive science to
build an action influence model for reinforcement learning
agents. Our approach learns a structural causal (SCM) model
during reinforcement learning and has the ability to generate
explanations for why and why not questions by counterfactual
analysis of the learned SCM. We conducted a comprehensive
human study (n=120) to evaluate our model on 1) task pre-
diction, 2) explanation ‘goodness’ and 3) trust. Results show
that our model performs significantly better for former 2 eval-
uation criteria. One weakness of our model is the need of
knowing the causal model in advance for the given domain.
Future work includes using epistemic knowledge of the ex-
plainee to provide explanations that are more targetted, and
to developing a suitable abstraction model that can select the
relevant level of abstraction for the explainee. We also aim to
extend our model to non-factored states in future.
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